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Abstract
In this paper, we consider the problem of optimal reinsurance design, when
the risk is measured by a distortion risk measure and the premium is given
by a distortion risk premium. First, we show how the optimal reinsurance
design for the ceding company, the reinsurance company and the social planner
can be formulated in the same way. Second, by introducing the “marginal
indemnification functions”, we characterize the optimal reinsurance contracts.
We show that, for an optimal policy, the associated marginal indemnification
function only takes the values zero and one. We will see how the roles of the
market preferences and premiums and that of the total risk are separated.
1 Introduction
The problem of optimal reinsurance design lies at the heart of reinsurance studies. A
reinsurance policy is a contract, according to which part of the risk of an insurance
company (the ceding company) is transferred to another insurance company (the
reinsurance company), in exchange for receiving a premium. Different reinsurance
contracts have been introduced in the reinsurance market among which the quota-
share, stop-loss, stop-loss after quota-share and quota-share after stop-loss have re-
ceived more attention due to their appealing optimality properties. Borch (1960)
(and also Arrow (1963)) showed that, subject to a budget constraint, the stop-loss
policy is an optimal reinsurance contract for the ceding company when the risk is
measured by variance (or by a utility function). Recent extensions of the same prob-
lem have been studied in Kaluszka (2001), Young (1999), Okolewski and Kaluszka
(2008).
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The problem of optimal reinsurance design has been studied by using risk mea-
sures and risk premiums, due to their development and application in finance and
insurance. For instance, in a framework where the ceding company’s risk is mea-
sured either by Value at Risk (VaR) or Conditional Tail Expectation (CTE)1, with
the Expected Value Premium Principle as the risk premium, Cai and Tan (2007)
found the optimal retention levels. Later, in the same framework, Cai et al. (2008)
showed that the stop-loss and the quota-share are the most optimal reinsurance con-
tracts. In Bernard and Tian (2009) also, the authors have considered optimal risk
management strategies of an insurance company subject to regulatory constraints
when the risk is measured by VaR and CVaR. In recent years, researchers have tried
to extend the optimal reinsurance design problem to larger families of risk measures
and risk premiums. For instance, Cheung (2010) and Chi and Tan (2013) have ex-
tended the problem by using a family of general risk premiums; in these two papers
the risk of the ceding company is measured either by VaR or CTE. On the other
hand, Cheung et al. (2014) have extended the problem by using general law-invariant
convex risk measures, whereas the risk premium is considered to be the Expected
Value Premium Principle. In the existing literature, either only the family of risk
measures or only the family of risk premiums is extended, while in many applications
it is desirable to extend both at the same time.
The present paper, considers a framework which extends, at the same time, the set
of risk measures and the risk premiums to the family of distortion risk measures and
premiums. First, we show that in this framework the ceding, the reinsurance and the
social planner problems can be formulated in the same way. Second, we characterize
the optimal solutions by introducing the notion of marginal indemnification function.
A marginal indemnification function is the marginal rate of changes in the value of a
reinsurance contract. We show that any optimal solution to the reinsurance problem
has a marginal indemnification function which only takes the values zero and one.
Remarkably, we can separate the roles of the market preferences and premiums and
that of the total risk are separated. Finally, we have to point out that, by using
a very simple fact that any Lipschitz continuous function has a derivative that is
bounded by its Lipschitz constant, we introduce a useful technique in this paper
that can generalize many already existing results to the distortion risk measures and
risk premiums.
It is worth mentioning that the families of distortion risk measures and risk
premiums contain very important particular cases; for instance, the family of the
co-monotone sub-additive law invariant coherent risk measures es (Kusuoka (2001)),
1It can be shown that for continuous distributions, CTE is equal to the Conditional Value at
Risk (CVaR), which will be introduced later in this paper.
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the family of generalized spectral risk measures (Cont et al. (2010)), the generalized
distortion measures of risk (Wang (1995)), Wang’s risk premiums (Wang (1995) and
Wang et al. (1997)), Expected Value Premium Principle and many others.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the mathemat-
ical notions and notations that we use in this paper. In Section 3 the general set-up
of the ceding, the reinsurance and the social planner problems will be presented.
In Section 4 the results on characterizing the optimal reinsurance contracts will be
presented. In Section 5 we provide some corollaries and examples.
2 Preliminaries and Notations
Let (Ω, P,F) be a probability space, where Ω is the “states of the nature”, P is
the physical probability measure and F is the σ- field of measurable subsets of Ω.
Let p, q ∈ [1,∞] be two numbers such that 1/p + 1/q = 1. We denote the space
of all random variables with p’th finite moment with Lp, i.e., Lp = {X : Ω → R :
E (|X|p) < ∞}, where E denotes the expectation w.r.t P . Recall that according to
the Riesz Representation Theorem, Lq is the dual space of Lp when p 6= ∞. Recall
also that the space Lp is endowed with two topologies, first the norm topology induced
by ‖X‖p = E(|X|
p)
1
p , and second the weak topology, induced by Lq i.e. the coarsest
topology in which all members of Lq are continuous. The set of all random variables
on Ω is denoted by L0. If instead of Ω we used R the same definitions and statements
hold.
In this paper, we consider only two period of time, 0 and T , where 0 represents
the beginning of the year, when a contract is written, and T represents the end of the
year, when liabilities are settled. Every random variable represents losses at time T .
For any X ∈ LP , the cumulative distribution function associated with X is denoted
by FX .
2.1 Distortion Risk Measures
Let g be a non-decreasing real function from [0, 1] to [0, 1] such that g(0) = 1−g(1) =
0. A distortion risk measure ̺ (see for example Wang et al. (1997) and Sereda et al.
(2010)) is a mapping from Lp to the set of real numbers R and is introduced as2
2This form is a bit more general than the usual definition of a distortion risk measure, since we
assumed for the moment that X could be any member of Lp. Actually, this is a particular form
of the Choquet integral, when the capacity v is given by v(S) = g(P (S)), for any measurable set
S ∈ F .
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̺(X) =
0ˆ
−∞
(g(SX(t))− 1) dt+
∞ˆ
0
g(SX(t))dt, (1)
where SX = 1−FX is the survival function associated with X . In the literature, g is
known as the distortion function. A more convenient representation for a distortion
risk measure can be found in terms of Value at Risk. Let Π(x) = 1− g(1− x). By a
simple change of variable, one can see that the distortion form (1) can be represented
as
̺(X) =
ˆ 1
0
VaRt(X)dΠ(t), (2)
where
VaRα(X) = inf{x ∈ R|P (X > x) ≤ 1− α}, α ∈ [0, 1].
In the sequel, the risk measure ̺ above is denoted by ̺Π to show its connection
with Π. A popular example of a distortion risk measure is Value at Risk, introduced
earlier, where Π(t) = 1[α,1](t). A Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR) is a distortion
risk measure whose distortion function is given by Π(t) = t−α
1−α
1[α,1](t), and can be
represented as
CVaRα(X) =
1
1− α
ˆ 1
α
VaRt(X)dt. (3)
The family of spectral risk measures which was introduced first in Acerbi (2002),
has the same representation as (2), where Π is also convex. One can readily see
that ̺Π is positive homogeneity, translation invariant, monotone, law invariance and
comonotonic additive. It can be shown that all law-invariant co-monotone additive
coherent risk measures can be represented as (2); see Kusuoka (2001). A risk mea-
sure in the form (2) is important from different perspectives. First of all it makes a
link between the risk measures theory and the behavioral finance as the form (2) is
a particular form of Choquet utility. Second, (2) contains a family of risk measures
which are statistically robust. In Cont et al. (2010) it is shown that a risk measure
̺(x) =
´ 1
0
VaRt(x)dΠ(t) is robust if and only if the support of ϕ =
dΠ(t)
dt
(the deriva-
tive is in general a distribution and not a function) is away from zero and one. For
example Value at Risk is a risk measure with this property.
For more reading on distortion risk measures one can see Sereda et al. (2010),
Wu and Zhou (2006), Balba´s et al. (2009) and Wang et al. (1997).
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2.2 Distortion Risk Premiums
A risk premium in general is introduced as a continuous mapping on Lp+ which maps
any loss variable to a number representing its premium. A general definition for the
risk premium in the literature is proposed by Wang et al. (1997) in an axiomatic
manner. Wang et al. (1997) characterize the family of cash invariant, positive homo-
geneous, co-monotone additive risk premiums which satisfy the following continuity
property
lim
d→∞
π(X ∧ d) = π(X) and lim
d→0
π((X − d)+) = π(X),
as
π(X) =
∞ˆ
0
g(SX(t))dt, (4)
where g : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] is a non-decreasing function such that g(0) = 0 and g(1) = 1.
When the function g is convex the premium is called Wang’s Premium Principle.
By similar change of variable for risk measures (i.e., Π(x) = 1 − g(1 − x)), the
following equality holds for a premium represented in (4)
π(X) =
1ˆ
0
VaRt(X)dΠ(t). (5)
Definition 1. Let Π : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] be a non-decreasing function such that Π(0) =
Π(1)− 1 = 0. The distortion premium πΠ is introduced as
πΠ(X) =
ˆ 1
0
VaRt(X)dΠ(t). (6)
A popular example of a distortion risk premium is a Wang’s premium3 introduced
by the following distortion function known as Wang’s transformation
gβ(x) = Φ(Φ
−1(x) + β), (7)
where β ∈ R is a real number and Φ is the CDF of the normal distribution with the
mean equal to zero and the standard deviation equal to one.
3This premium was first introduced by Wang, however in general if Π is convex we also call a
distortion premium a Wang premium.
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3 Problem Set-up
In this section, we set up the optimal reinsurance design problem for the ceding
company, the reinsurance company and the social planner4, and, show that they
can be expressed in a unifying framework. Although, we do not need to introduce
the ceding and the reinsurance companies, as they are known in the literature of
actuarial science, we introduce briefly the social planner: the social planner is a
decision-maker who is concerned with maximizing the total welfare, which in our
setting is minimizing the total risk. Social planner is different than the regulator, as
they have different concerns, for example a regulator would ask companies to hold
a minimum capital reserve even if it goes against the maximality of the economic
welfare.
Let us denote the annual risk of an insurance company by a non-negative loss
variable X0. In general, a reinsurance company will accept to cover part of the risk,
in exchange for receiving a premium. Let us denote the part of the risk covered by the
re-insurer by XR and the part covered by the insurance company by XI = X0−X
R.
We assume that 0 ≤ XR ≤ X0. The premium received by the reinsurance company
is (1 + ρ)π(XR), where ρ ≥ 0 is a relative safety loading. Therefore, the global loss
of the ceding company, denoted by T I , can be expressed as
T I = XI + (1 + ρ)π
(
XR
)
. (8)
In the same manner for the re-insurer we have
TR = XR − (1 + ρ)π
(
XR
)
, (9)
We introduce three problems as follows
• Ceding problem. The ceding company minimizes its total risk by solving the
following problem
min
0≤XI≤X0
̺I
(
XI + (1 + ρ)π
(
XR
))
,
where ̺I is a risk measure used by the insurance company.
• Reinsurance problem. The re-insurer tries to find the best XR which mini-
mizes its total risk
min
0≤XR≤X0
̺R
(
XR − (1 + ρ)π
(
XR
))
,
where ̺R is a risk measure used by the reinsurance company.
4The term “social planner” is from economics literature.
6
• Social planner problem. The social planner is concerned with the best
allocation (XI , XR) minimizing the economy’s total risk
min
0≤XR≤X0
{
̺R
(
XR − (1 + ρ)π
(
XR
))
+ ̺I
(
XI + (1 + ρ)π
(
XR
))}
.
By cash-invariance property of distortion risk measures, we can rewrite these prob-
lems as follows
• Ceding problem.
min
0≤XI≤X0
̺I
(
XI
)
+ (1 + ρ)π
(
X0 −X
I
)
. (10)
• Reinsurance problem.
min
0≤XR≤X0
̺R
(
XR
)
− (1 + ρ)π
(
XR
)
. (11)
• Social planner problem.
min
0≤XR≤X0
̺R
(
XR
)
+ ̺I
(
XI
)
. (12)
Now we assume that both the ceding and retained loss variables are non-decreasing
functions of the global loss variable. This assumption rules out the risk of moral
hazard, as both sides have to feel any increase in the global loss (seeHeimer (1989)
and Bernard and Tian (2009) for further discussions on moral hazard and insurance).
Therefore, the set of admissible ceding loss functions is defined as
C = {0 ≤ f(x) ≤ x|f(0) = 0, f(x) and x− f(x) are non-decreasing}.
The set C is known as the space of indemnification functions.
Theorem 1. Let us assume that XR = f(X0) where f ∈ C. The ceding, reinsurance
and the social planner problems can be unified in the following general framework
min
f∈C
a1Λ1(X0 − f(X0)) + a2Λ2(f(X0)), (13)
where Λi, i = 1, 2 are either distortion risk measure or premium and ai, i = 1, 2 are
positive numbers.
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Proof. The problem (10) is naturally in the form (13), if a1 = 1 and a2 = 1+ρ. Note
that if f ∈ C then x 7→ x−f(x) also belongs to C. Therefore, (12) can be written in
the form (13) if a1 = a2 = 1. Now, we only need to show that (11) can be written in
the form of (13). Let k(x) = x− f(x). From construction, we know that k belongs
to C and that XI = k(X0). It is known that VaR commutes with non-decreasing
functions, given this fact
π
(
XR
)
= π(f(X0)) =
ˆ 1
0
VaRt (f(X0)) dΠpi(t)
=
ˆ 1
0
f(VaRt(X0))dΠpi(t) =
ˆ 1
0
(VaRt(X0)− k(VaRt(X0)))dΠpi(t)
= π(X0)−
ˆ 1
0
k(VaRt(X0))dΠpi(t) = π(X0)−
ˆ 1
0
VaR(k(X0))dΠpi(t)
= π(X0)− π
(
XI
)
= π (X0)− π
(
X0 −X
R
)
.
Therefore, the reinsurance problem can be written as
min
k∈C
{
̺R (X0 − k(X0)) + (1 + ρ)π (k(X0))
}
− (1 + ρ)π(X0). (14)
Except the second part, which is a constant number, the first part is in the form of
(13).
Before moving on further into our discussions, we would like to remark on some
facts regarding the ceding, reinsurance and the social planner problems.
Remark 1. Observe that if both the ceding and the reinsurance company use the same
risk measure ̺, by using the fact that VaR commutes with non-deceasing functions,
we have
̺(X0 − f(X0)) + ̺(f(X0)) = ̺(X0), ∀f ∈ C.
This means, no matter what contract the ceding and reinsurance companies use,
as far as there is no risk of moral hazard in the reinsurance market, the total risk
remains constant. This is likely if the regulator imposes a unique risk measure to be
used by all companies, for example the same VaR0.995, for the capital reserve. On the
other hand, this fact has a serious implication, that, if ceding company minimizes
his/her global risk by using a contract f(X0), the same contract will maximize the
reinsurance company’s global risk. And even further, if XI = X0− f(X0) minimizes
the risk of the ceding company, XR = X0 − f(X0) will also minimize the risk of the
reinsurance company. This is in contrast with reciprocal-reinsurance-treaties.
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Remark 2. It is known that VaRα is co-monotone additive, which implies that any
distortion risk measure or premium is also co-monotone additive. This implies that
every distortion risk or premium is linear on a set of co-monotone random variables;
in particular it is linear on the following admissible space of solutions
A = {f(X0)|f ∈ C}.
If we denote the function f 7→ a1Λ1(X0 − f(X0)) + a2Λ2(f(X0)) by Γ(f) then we
have
Γ
(
n∑
i=1
γifi
)
=
n∑
i=1
γiΓ (fi) , (15)
where γi ≥ 0,
n∑
i=1
γi = 1 and fi ∈ C, for i = 1, .., n.
It is known if a function f is Lipschitz continuous, it is almost everywhere differen-
tiable and its derivative is essentially bounded by its Lipschitz constant. Therefore,
function f can be written as the integral of its derivative. As a result C can be
represented as
C =
{
f : R+ → R+
∣∣∣f(x) = ˆ x
0
h(t)dt, 0 ≤ h ≤ 1
}
.
We introduce the space of marginal indemnification functions as
D =
{
h : R+ → R+
∣∣∣0 ≤ h ≤ 1} .
Definition 2. For any indemnification function f ∈ C, the associated marginal
indemnification is a function h ∈ D such that
f(x) =
ˆ x
0
h(t)dt, x ≥ 0.
The interpretation of a marginal indemnification function is as follows: if f(x) =´ x
0
h(t)dt is a contract, then at each value X0 = x, a marginal change δ to the value
of the global loss will result in marginal change of the cedant risk at the size δh(x).
We will see in the following that in our framework the marginal change of an optimal
contract is either 0 or δ, i.e., h = 0 or 1.
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4 Optimal Solutions
In this section, we restrict our attention to a family of distortion risk measures and
premiums which satisfy the following regularity condition
lim
n→∞
Λi(X ∧ n) = Λi(X), i = 1, 2. (16)
Introduce ΨX0 and h
∗ as follows
Ψ(t) := (a2 − a1)− (a2Π2 (t)− a1Π1 (t)) , (17)
and
k∗(t) =


0 Ψ(t) > 0
1 Ψ(t) < 0
k˜(t) otherwise
, (18)
where k˜ could be any function between 0 and 1 on ΨX0 = 0. Here we state our main
result
Theorem 2. If Λ1 and Λ2 satisfy (16), the solutions to the general optimization
problem (13) is given by f(x) =
´ x
0
k∗(VaRt(X0))dt, where k
∗ is given by (18) and
(17). The value at minimum is also given by
a1Λ1(X0)−
ˆ ∞
0
Ψ−X0(t)dt. (19)
Remark 3. It is very important to see that k∗ only depends on market preferences
and premiums, and therefore, it is universal. Also one can see how the role of the
total risk and the market preferences are separated.
Proof. Since f(x) and x−f(x) are both non-decreasing, and also since VaRt commute
with monotone functions, we get
a1Λ1 (X0 − f(X0)) + a2Λ2 (f(X0))
= a1
ˆ 1
0
VaRt (X0 − f(X0)) dΠ1(t) + a2
ˆ 1
0
VaRt (f(X0)) dΠ2(t)
= a1
ˆ 1
0
(VaRα(X0)− f(VaRt(X0))) dΠ1(t) + a2
ˆ 1
0
f (VaRt(X0)) dΠ2(t). (20)
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Using the representation we have already introduced for the members of C in terms
of the members of D, there exists h ∈ D such that f(x) =
´ x
0
h(t)dt. Therefore, we
have
a1Λ1(X0 − f(X0)) + a2Λ2(f(X0))
= a1
ˆ 1
0
VaRt(X0)dΠ1(t)−a1
ˆ 1
0
ˆ VaRt(X0)
0
h(s)dsdΠ1(t)+a2
ˆ 1
0
ˆ VaRt(X0)
0
h(s)dsdΠ2(t).
(21)
First, we assume X0 is bounded. By Fubini’s Theorem, (21) gives
a1Λ1(X0 − f(X0)) + a2Λ2(f(X0))
= a1Λ1(X0) +
ˆ ∞
0
(
a2
ˆ 1
FX0(t)
dΠ2(s)− a1
ˆ 1
FX0(t)
dΠ1(s)
)
h(t)dt
= a1Λ1(X0) +
ˆ ∞
0
(a2 (Π2(1)− Π2 (FX0(s)))− a1 (Π1(1)− Π1 (FX0(s)))) h(s)ds
= a1
ˆ 1
0
VaRs (X0) dΠ1(s) +
ˆ ∞
0
Ψ (FX0(s)) h(s)ds, (22)
where in the last line we use the fact that Π1(1) = Π2(1) = 1. It is clear that the
following h∗ will minimize (22)
h∗(s) =


0 Ψ (FX0(s)) > 0
1 Ψ (FX0(s)) < 0
h˜(s) otherwise
,
where h˜ could be any function between zero and one on Ψ (FX0(s)) = 0. Since we
are free to choose the values of h∗ on Ψ = 0, we may equalize it either to 0 or 1. The
value of the minimum also is equal to
a1Λ1(X0)−
ˆ ∞
0
Ψ−(t)dt.
By a simple change of variable t = FX0(s), we get the result for bounded X0.
Now let us in general assume that X0 is not bounded. It is clear that at each
point t, {Πi ◦ FX0∧n(t)}n=1,2,... , i = 1, 2 are non-increasing with respect to n. On the
other hand, for any t, there exist nt such that if n > nt then FX0∧n(t) = FX0(t).
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Therefore, for any t, we have that Πi(FX0∧n(t)) ↓ Πi(FX0(t)), i = 1, 2. Now by
Monotone Convergence Theorem we have that
lim
n→∞
∞ˆ
0
Πi (FX0∧n(t))h(t)dt =
∞ˆ
0
Πi (FX0(t))h(t)dt, i = 1, 2,
for any function h ∈ D. Using this fact, our continuity assumption (16) and that f
is non-decreasing we have
Λi (f(X0)) = lim
n→∞
Λi (f(X0) ∧ f(n))
= lim
n→∞
Λi (f(X0 ∧ n))
= lim
n→∞
ˆ ∞
0
(Πi(1)− Πi(FX0∧n(t))) h(t)dt
=
ˆ ∞
0
(Πi(1)−Πi(FX0(t)))h(t)dt,
for i = 1, 2. This simply results in
a1Λ1(f(X0)) + a2Λ2(X0 − f(X0))
= a1Λ1(X0) +
ˆ ∞
0
(a2 (Π2(1)−Π2 (FX0(t)))− a1 (Π1(1)−Π1 (FX0(t))))) h(t)dt
The rest of the proof follows the same lines after (21).
5 Corollaries and Examples
In this section, we use the theory we have developed in last sections to find the
optimal solutions for particular cases. However before that, we consider further
assumptions.
First, we assume that the cumulative distribution function FX0 and the distortion
function Π2 are strictly increasing; for instance when X0 is the value of a compound
Poisson process with exponential claims at time T , and π is expectation or Wang’s
premium. On the other hand, we assume a1 = 1 and a2 = 1 + ρ, when ρ is a
relative safety load. In the literature when VaRα or CVaRα is used, it is assumed
usually that α(1+ ρ) ≤ 1. Given that α is always a number very close to 1, (usually
α ∈ [0.9, 0.99]), it means that ρ has to be small, precisely, smaller than 1−α
α
. In the
following, we assume a different assumption that ρ
1+ρ
< Π2(α). Note that if ρ is a
small enough this assumption always holds. Let d∗ and a∗ be two real numbers such
that FX0 (d
∗) = ρ
1+ρ
and Π2 (FX0 (a
∗)) = ρ
1+ρ
= FX0 (d
∗) and let L = F−1X0 (α)− a
∗.
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Corollary 1. If we let Λ1 = VaRα, then the optimal solution for the ceding company
is a stop-loss contract described as
XR =


0 X0 ≤ a
∗
X0 − L a
∗ < X0 < a
∗ + L
a∗ X0 ≥ a
∗ + L
.
Proof. We know that since Λ1 = VaRα, Π1(t) = 1[α,1](t). Therefore,
Ψ(t) =
{
ρ− (1 + ρ)Π2(FX0(t)) t < F
−1
X0
(α)
ρ+ 1− (1 + ρ)Π2(FX0(t)) t ≥ F
−1
X0
(α)
,
The second line in definition of Ψ above is clearly non-negative. The first line is non-
negative if ρ−(1+ρ)Π2(FX0(t)) ≥ 0 and t < F
−1
X0
(α). Given that ρ
1+ρ
= Π2 (FX0 (a
∗)),
this is equivalent to say that t < a∗ and t < F−1X0 (α); or in sum
t < min
{
a∗, F−1X0 (α)
}
.
On the other hand, since by assumption Π2(FX0(a
∗)) = ρ
1+ρ
< Π2(α), then a
∗ <
F−1X0 (α). This implies that a
∗ = min
{
a∗, F−1X0 (α)
}
. Hence, Ψ is non-positive on
interval
(
a∗, F−1X0 (α)
)
= (a∗, a∗ + L). Therefore, h∗ is given as
h∗(t) =
{
1 a∗ < t < a∗ + L
0 otherwise
.
By integrating h over t,
f ∗(x) =


0 x ≤ a∗
x− a∗ a∗ < x < a∗ + L
L x ≥ a∗ + L
.
Remark 4. In particular if π is expectation then a∗ = d∗, and our result is consistent
with the existing results in the literature.
Corollary 2. If ̺ = CVaRα and Π2 is convex then the optimal policy is a stop-loss
policy described as
XR =


0 X0 ≤ a
∗
X0 − a
∗ a∗ < X0 < a
∗ + L∗
L X0 ≥ a
∗ + L∗
,
where L∗ is a number greater than L.
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Proof. In this case Π1(x) =
x−α
1−α
1[α,1] and therefore,
Ψ(t) =
{
ρ− (1 + ρ)Π2(FX0(t)) FX0(t) < α
ρ+
FX0(t)−α
1−α
− (1 + ρ)Π2(FX0(t)) FX0(t) ≥ α
.
To discover the structure of h∗, we have to see when Ψ is non-negative. The analysis
is very similar to the Corollary 1, except that, we need to find out when the second
line in the definition of Ψ is non-negative. First of all, observe that at FX0(t) = α,
the second line in the definition of Ψ becomes ρ− (1+ρ)Π2(α), which by assumption
FX0(d
∗) < Π2(α), yields Ψ(F
−1(α)) < 0. This shows that in the area {t : FX0(t) ≥
α}, Ψ can be negative (unlike the previous corollary). Since Π2 is convex, the second
line in the definition of Ψ is a convex function of FX0(t) which is zero at FX0(t) = 1.
Since we have shown Ψ is negative at FX0(t) = α, we infer that there exists a solution
b∗ to ρ +
FX0(t)−α
1−α
− (1 + ρ)Π2(FX0(t)) = 0, strictly greater than F
−1
X0
(α) = a∗ + L,
such that Ψ is non-negative between b∗ and 1. Therefore,
h(t) =
{
1 a∗ < FX0(t) < b
∗
0 otherwise
.
This shows that, similar to the case that the ceding company’s risk measure is VaRα,
the optimal reinsurance for CVaRα is again stop-loss, but with a greater liability
L∗ = b∗ − a∗.
Remark 5. In particular, if π is expectation, we have b∗ = F−1X0
(
α+(1−α)ρ
1−(1−α)(1+ρ)
)
.
Example 1. Let us again consider the ceding problem. Assume that the ceding risk
measure is CVaRα and the risk premium for the reinsurance company is a Wang’s
premium given as in (7). Again we fix a relative safety load. One can find Ψ as
follows
Ψ(t) := ρ+
(
FX0(t)− α
1− α
1[α,1] (FX0(t))− (1 + ρ)
(
1− Φ(Φ−1(1− FX0(t)) + β)
))
.
In the Figures 1 and 2 we have depicted Ψ ◦F−1X0 and k = h
∗∗ ◦F−1X0 , respectively,
for different scenarios. As one can see in all case we have a policy h∗ associated with
a stop-loss policy. From the Figure 1, one can see that if β is small, it is more likely
that the policy becomes a degenerate policy, by transferring the whole risk to the
reinsurance company, for all levels of risk aversion. On the other hand, by looking at
the Figure 2, with a fixed β, one can see that the higher the level of risk aversion is
14
the higher the retention level is. Even at level α = 0.99 one can see that the policy
is a degenerate policy, and all the risk is transferred to the reinsurance company.
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Figure 1: The function Ψ for ρ = 0.5 and different β and α.
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Figure 2: The marginal indemnification function k∗, for parameters β = 3.6 and
ρ = 0.5.
Example 2. Let us consider that the ceding company uses VaRα and the reinsurance
company VaRβ , when α < β.
Ψ(t) =


ρ FX0(t) < α
ρ+ 1 α ≤ FX0(t) < β
0 FX0(t) ≥ β
.
This shows that f(x) = 0, and therefore, the ceding company should not transfer
any part of her risk to the reinsurance company. In the opposite direction if α > β,
the same is true for the reinsurance company, that means the reinsurance company
has to accept the whole risk.
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